

Causes and Responses to the Opioid Epidemic: A Policy Analysis

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Abstract

3
4 The opioid epidemic has become one of the largest public health crises of our time. The
5 most important and devastating element of this crisis is the number of fatalities. The Centers
6 for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 130 Americans die from an opioid
7 overdose on a daily basis. [1] Data provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
8 indicate that between 1999 and 2017 there have been more than 400,000 deaths attributed to
9 an opioid overdose.[1] The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) estimates that
10 10.3 million people misused prescription opioids in 2018 alone. [2] This number does not
11 include the number of people using heroin in the U.S. In 2016 roughly 948,000 Americans
12 reported using heroin in the past year.[3] About 170,000 Americans reported first time heroin
13 use in 2016. Compare this number to the 90,000 first time users in 2006 and it becomes clear
14 how significant the rise in heroin use is. [3] There is now a rising incidence of newborns
15 experiencing withdrawal syndrome due to opioid use and misuse during pregnancies. This
16 means that the opioid epidemic’s impact will continue to be felt for generations to come. It is
17 imperative that interventions are developed now to reduce this ripple effect and eventually end
18 this decades-long problem.

Impact on Public Health

19
20 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services declared the opioid epidemic as a
21 public health emergency in 2017. [2] The National Drug Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), one of
22 the departments of the National Institutes of Health, specifically explained in their strategic
23 plan from 2016 to 2020 how the opioid epidemic affects public health. Under goal number four,
24 NIDA states,” A range of public health issues are associated with the current crisis of opioid

25 abuse, including opioid use disorders, opioid overdoses, neonatal abstinence syndrome, and
26 increased spread of infectious diseases like HIV and hepatitis C (HCV)". [4] The World Health
27 Organization (WHO) estimates that in 2016 there was a 21% increase in drug overdose deaths
28 from previous years. [5] This crisis has the public demanding more access to treatment and
29 other public health programs. [6] Public health offers an infrastructure for development of
30 strategies preventing and addressing this epidemic.

31 **Methods**

32 The primary goal of this paper is to describe policy responses and discuss how they
33 should be prioritized. The study is based on existing published evidence and interviews of
34 several local Chicago area experts. The opioid epidemic is an area of critical need for
35 investment which must be met with evidence based solutions. In order to gather this
36 information, articles were identified through searches conducted on the Galter Health Sciences
37 Library & Learning Center, PlusOS, Pubmed, Google Scholar, PsycInfo and MedLine using
38 keywords such as opioid epidemic, public health, opioid use trends, and opioid policies. Current
39 policy recommendations available from both the CDC, HHS, and other government entities
40 were reviewed. In addition to these articles, interviews were conducted with three local
41 Chicago-based experts to determine their views on policy prioritization. These local Chicago-
42 based experts were Dr. Howard Kim, Dr. Elizabeth Salisbury-Afshar, and Suzanne Carlberg-
43 Racich PhD.

44 **Timeline of the Epidemic**

45 During the announcement from President Donald Trump labeling the current opioid
46 epidemic as a public health emergency he commented, " Nobody has seen anything like what's

47 going on now.” [7] However, it is important to recognize that this comment is inaccurate. The
48 current opioid epidemic is not the first opioid epidemic in the U.S.

49 The first opioid epidemic occurred between 1850 to 1914. During this time unregulated
50 and highly promoted medications with opium and morphine were widely prescribed and even
51 used by children. [8] There was no regulation for when it was appropriate to use these
52 medications and what ailments would require them. At this time, many Americans were widely
53 using opium and morphine for pain management. This prompted the government to pass the
54 Harrison Narcotic Control Act of 1914. This act regulated the sale of narcotics in order to reduce
55 the use of street heroin. [9] In this same timeframe, aspirin was developed as a pain relief
56 alternative as well as publications proving how addictive heroin was in order to reduce use. [10]
57 However, the Harrison act did not prohibit physicians, dentists, and veterinary surgeons from
58 prescribing these medications. There were cities that established narcotics dispensaries to
59 provide users with legal supplies of drugs until treatment facilities could be provided. [10] By
60 the 1920s, these clinics had closed and only the elderly who could die from withdrawal were
61 provided with morphine. While the use of prescription opioids diminished as time continued
62 on, the use of heroin began to rise in the latter half of the 1900s.

63 Heroin use gained popularity in the 1960s-1970s. Heroin is an illicit opioid synthesized
64 from morphine that can be a white or brown powder, or a black sticky substance. [11] The
65 popularity is largely attributed to Vietnam War soldiers being exposed to heroin during their
66 overseas tours. This spike in heroin use was especially seen in urban populations. In New York
67 City, it was noted that the African-American and Puerto Rican adolescents were dying of heroin-
68 related incidents at higher rates than anything else. [7] Additionally, the mean age for heroin

69 users was about 16.5 years old males and heroin was the first opioid they had abused. [12] This
70 rise in heroin use is one of the primary catalysts for President Nixon’s “War on Drugs”. This
71 “war” resulted in higher use of law enforcement, harsher sentences for both users and dealers,
72 and a reduction in foreign shipments of heroin and marijuana. [7] These results transitioned the
73 heroin epidemic into the crack cocaine epidemic. In order to understand the magnitude of the
74 current epidemic compared to the earlier epidemics, there were fewer than 3,000 overdose
75 deaths in 1970. [7]

76 The crack cocaine surge began to rise in the 1980s. It first came in powder form then
77 transitioned into hardened cocaine rocks. Crack cocaine was thought to be less dangerous
78 because it was smoked like marijuana. [7] It was also an alternative for those who were afraid
79 of needles and wary of heroin.[7] The crack cocaine increase use resulted in the Anti-Drug
80 Abuse Act of 1986.[13] This act increased prison sentences for crack cocaine and other illegal
81 substances which disproportionately impacted African-Americans. The American Civil Liberties
82 Union (ACLU) released a statement in 2006 acknowledging that in the 20 years since this law
83 was enacted it, “effectively transformed federal prisons into institutions increasingly dedicated
84 to incarcerating African Americans.”[14] African Americans made up 15 percent of the country’s
85 drug users, yet they made up 74 percent of those sentenced to prison for a drug offense. [14]
86 Even with the current epidemic rising, heroin use never went away.

87 There have been three “waves” of opioid overdose deaths in the United States during
88 the current epidemic. These “waves” are best visualized in Figure 1. The first wave began in the
89 1990s with the increased prescribing of opioids. The impacts of these prescriptions are
90 discussed in the next section of this paper, focusing on natural and semi-synthetic opioids as

91 well as methadone prescriptions. Natural opioids include morphine and codeine.[11] Semi-
92 synthetic opioids include oxycodone, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, and oxymorphone. [11]
93 The overdose death toll saw a significant increase by 1999. [1]

94 The second wave began in 2010 involving an increase in heroin deaths in addition to the
95 prescription opioid deaths continuing from the first wave. In 2012 alone, 259 million
96 prescriptions were written for opioid painkillers. [6] In addition to (or as a consequence of) the
97 increase in legal prescribing since the first wave there was an escalation in illegal heroin use
98 overdoses. The increase in heroin overdose deaths increased from 3,036 in 2010 to 8,257 in
99 2013. [6] The rise in use of heroin is largely attributed to its low cost and easy accessibility.

100 The third wave began in 2013 and included significant increases in overdose deaths
101 involving synthetic opioids (specifically focusing on illicitly manufactured fentanyl). [1] Fentanyl
102 is a synthetic opioid that is 50 to 100 times more powerful than morphine.[15] This new illicit
103 opioid of choice is considered to be cheaper and up to fifty times more potent than heroin. The
104 opioid epidemic now spans almost 30 years with currently no end in sight.

105 **Causes of the Epidemic**

106 **Chronic Pain Management**

107 Opinions vary on the primary root causes of the epidemic. A recent poll indicated that
108 33% of the public blame doctors who inappropriately prescribe painkillers. [16] This is an
109 important belief that has a traceable history in the context of chronic pain management. Pain is
110 a complex disease that involves subjectivity. Pain burden reduces quality of life and imparts
111 high socioeconomic and health care costs. [17] In 1973 in the Annals of Internal Medicine, a
112 manuscript described a failure to treat patients in severe pain with adequate doses of opioid

113 analgesics. [18]This was then brought up again in 1990 by Max stating, “therapeutic use of
114 opiate analgesics rarely results in addiction.” [19] This misconception was further enforced with
115 the belief that opioids should not only be reserved for cancer patients but should be freely used
116 for all those in chronic pain. [20] In 1995, the American Pain Society began their “pain as the
117 fifth vital sign” campaign. [21]The Veteran’s Health Administration in 1999 decided to adopt the
118 American Pain Society’s initiative. [22] This thinking is believed to have kicked off the first wave.

119 There was a change in attitude towards opioid prescribing beginning around 2000. The
120 Federation of State Medical Boards and the Drug Enforcement Agency both issued statements
121 that indicated less scrutiny over opioid prescribers from a regulatory standpoint. [23] The
122 relaxing of these regulations allowed pharmaceutical companies to step into the arena.
123 Pharmaceutical companies saw the opportunity to begin heavily marketing their opioid
124 products and developing new ones for this new pain management era. OxyContin, extended
125 release oxycodone, became one of the new pain management favorites . The number of
126 prescriptions for it increased from 670,000 to 6.2 million between 1997-2002. [24] This
127 reframing of pain management was felt world-wide. In Scotland, dispensation of oxycodone,
128 fentanyl, and morphine increased five- fold between 1995 and 2010.[25] The number of opioid
129 prescriptions quadrupled between 2000 and 2010 in the United Kingdom.[25] However,
130 prescription opioids have not been shown to be effective in treating long-term pain. A study
131 involving the review of evidence on the effectiveness and harms of long-term (>3 months)
132 opioid therapy for chronic pain in adults concluded that there is insufficient evidence opioid
133 therapy is effective in long-term chronic pain care. [26] This same study also finds there is no
134 research on long-term effectiveness of prescription opioids for use of greater than one year.

135 Another article in the Clinical Journal of Pain reviewed the evidence on opioid efficacy. This
136 article found that analgesic efficacy, although initially good, is not always sustained during
137 continuous and long-term opioid therapy (months to years). [27] Therefore, based upon recent
138 evidence, use of prescription opioids for chronic pain lacks efficacy in pain management and
139 advance the possibility of addiction. This leaves those living with chronic pain to seek
140 alternatives when they hit their tolerance to these prescription opioids. The alternative in this
141 case seems to be heroin and fentanyl. Evidence points to prescription opioid turning to heroin
142 in part because it has become more accessible and far less expensive than prescription opioids.
143 [12]

144 Deaths of Despair

145 Job losses due to globalization has now become implicated as another cause of this
146 epidemic. Job losses related to trade have impacted the Appalachian region hardest. Over the
147 last 20 years, this region has accounted for 16% of trade-related job losses while only
148 accounting for 8% of the United States population. [28] In this same region, the death rates of
149 overdoses are 65% higher than in the rest of the United States as seen in Figure 2. [29] This has
150 become so common that the Appalachian Regional Commission has termed these “deaths of
151 despair”. In the U.S., every 1,000 trade-related job losses led to an 11.3% increase in overdose
152 deaths. [28] Additionally, the National Bureau of Economic Research found a correlation
153 between the rise imports from China and rise in overdose deaths. [30] Trade-related jobs
154 generally requires physical labor that leads workers to suffer from chronic pain, use opioids
155 during employment, and therefore face an increased risk of transitioning from prescribed
156 opioids to heroin.[31]

157 When workers find new employment due to trade-related job loss, the resulting
158 dislocation increases the risk of opioid-related overdose deaths.[31] Finkelstein, et al conducted
159 a review of those enrolled in Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) to determine if there is a
160 link between prescription opioid abuse and location. [32] Those enrolled in Social Security
161 Disability Insurance were selected by these authors due to roughly half receiving an opioid
162 prescription each year. Additionally, this group are on a fixed level of income therefore less
163 likely to move and are automatically enrolled in Medicare allowing for accessible data.
164 Finkelstein, et al concluded based upon the data that place-specific such as physician
165 prescribing behavior largely contribute to the prescription opioid epidemic. One such examples
166 is when an individual in this study moved from a county at the 25th percentile of prescription
167 opioid use rates to the 75th percentile, there was a 20 percent increase in the probability of
168 opioid abuse. [32]

169 The impact of public health impact of rising income and wealth inequality in the US is
170 not limited to the opioid epidemic. The other two epidemics that, in combination with the
171 opioid epidemic, produced rising middle age death rates are obesity and depression.
172 Additionally, these three epidemics appear to reinforce each other to continue the cycle. For
173 example, studies have found that obesity is a significant predictive factor for subsequent
174 depression, while depression is a predictive factor for subsequent obesity. [33] Depression has
175 a high correlation with substance use. Additionally, job loss and unemployment increase the
176 risk of depression and drug misuse, specifically among less-educated workers.[31] The
177 combination of these three epidemics are to blame for the lowering of life expectancy in the
178 United States. In December 2017, the CDC found that U.S. life expectancy had declined for the

179 second straight year, declining 0.1 years between 2015 to 2016 following a decline of the same
180 magnitude between 2014 and 2015. [33] America's healthy life years were 4.3 years lower than
181 the average of the top five countries in 2015 (Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Italy, and Israel).[33] As
182 time progresses, the gap will likely continue to widen.

183 **Epidemiologic Trends**

184 A study published in the Journal of Addictive Diseases reviewed the Researched Abuse,
185 Diversion and Addiction-Related Surveillance System poison center data and census data
186 between 2003-2006 to determine the epidemiologic trends in prescription opioid use. [34] This
187 study found that there was a strong positive trend indicating that prescription opioid drug rates
188 increase as poverty rate and unemployment rate increased. In regards to heroin use, trends
189 have changed from an inner-city, minority-centered problem as noted in the 1960s-1970s to
190 one that has a more widespread geographical distribution, involving primarily white men and
191 women in their late 20s living outside of large urban areas.[12] The Council on Foreign Relations
192 cited that non-Hispanic white Americans make up close to 80 percent of the annual total of
193 those who overdose. [35] The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation did a county-by-county study
194 on opioid use which demonstrated that the increase in premature deaths in 15- to 44-year-olds
195 is due to drug overdoses.[36] Heroin use increased significantly among those with a high school
196 education or less and in those who lived at less than 100% of the federal poverty line.[36]
197 Furthermore, heroin use patterns exhibit the same drug use patterns as those abusing
198 prescription opioids. [12] Geographically, the opioid epidemic has hit Appalachia, the
199 Southwest, and the New England regions hardest. [37] This directly reflects the previous

200 section’s discussion of deaths of despair. These racial and geographic trends have resulted in
201 increased political interest in addressing opioid overdose in these hard-hit regions. [37]

202 Cost of the Epidemic

203 There have been a variety of estimates on the monetary impacts of this epidemic. In
204 2013, Florence et al. estimated that prescription opioid overdose, abuse, and dependence in
205 the United States in 2013 cost \$78.5 billion. [38] The estimated costs encompass the increased
206 use of healthcare services, substance use treatment centers, criminal justice, and loss in
207 productivity (related to both fatal and nonfatal overdoses). Additionally, it is estimated that
208 one-third of this cost-estimate is attributable to the increased use of healthcare services alone
209 (see Figure 3). The Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) disagreed with Florence et al.’s estimate
210 arguing the need to account for the additional role of heroin abuse. They argue there is
211 evidence that fatality statistics understate the number of opioid-related deaths. [39] In order to
212 better estimate the cost for the epidemic, the CEA took into account the same components of
213 Florence et al. and added the value of lives lost. The CEA argues that determining the “value of
214 a statistical life” (VSL) should include more than lost earnings due to premature death. They
215 continue that, “earnings do not take into account other valuable activities in life besides work”
216 [39] The CEA determined the VSL should include a range to explain the variation in how
217 different groups of people value reductions in fatality risks. Therefore, VSL will vary with age to
218 control for the age distribution of overdose deaths, account for wage-distributions, and
219 occupational risk. In regards to the nonfatal costs of opioid use, Florence et al. only accounted
220 for the costs associated with prescription opioid use. The CEA used those costs and applied
221 them to heroin disorders as well to determine the total cost. Using this model, the CEA

222 estimates the opioid crisis cost \$696 billion in 2018—or 3.4 percent of GDP—and more than
223 \$2.5 trillion for the four-year period from 2015 to 2018. [39]

224 **Current Policies in the United States**

225 There are many stakeholders in the ending of this epidemic. This results in a variety of
226 policies and procedures aimed at reduction of opioid use. These policies include anywhere
227 between tracking prescriptions to legal penalties for using opioids. A state-level policy that is
228 gaining more attention is mandatory provider use of prescription drug monitoring programs
229 (PDMPs). These monitoring programs are used to by these states to track pharmacy
230 dispensation of controlled-prescriptions and the providers who are prescribing them. This helps
231 the state track which providers and pharmacies are over-prescribing and over-dispensing.
232 Additionally, providers can use the system to track a patient’s controlled substance history. This
233 history includes if a patient is receiving opioids from multiple providers and the total amount
234 prescribed. Providers can use this information to determine if a patient is at a higher risk of
235 opioid overdose. This allows both the providers to deliver preventative care and the states to
236 monitor overprescribing physicians. In Kentucky, this type of system was mandated in July
237 2012. The system resulted in an increase of providers requesting patient reports from 811,000
238 in 2011 to nearly 4.6 million in 2013. [40] While this does not mean these providers are using
239 the information regularly, it does indicate there can be more monitoring of patients to prevent
240 overprescribing.

241 The FDA has played a large role in policies associated with the opioid epidemic. An
242 example is when the FDA made an attempt to influence prescribing practices by providing an
243 outline for provider education through the creation of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies

244 (REMS) in 2007. [41] According to the FDA, REMS are, “designed to reinforce medication use
245 behaviors and actions that support the safe use of that medication.”[42] In 2012, there were
246 two opioid-related REMs constructed one for extended-release and long-acting (ER/LA) opioids
247 and another for transmucosal immediate-release fentanyl (TIRF) products, such as fentanyl
248 lozenges.[43] While the intentions from the FDA were risk reduction while not impacting
249 patient access to certain medications, according to Melissa Schulman, Senior Vice President for
250 Government and Public Affairs at CVS Health, the lack of standardization in the current REMs
251 program, “creates an unnecessary burden and practical impediment to their implementation.”
252 [44] In addition to this lack of standardization, critics also point out that REMs often require
253 significant additional amounts of time from physicians and pharmacists. There are some drugs
254 that require additional certifications for pharmacists and physicians prior to dispense and for
255 patients to complete mandatory tests. [44] It is important to note that no REMs were produced
256 for short-acting opioids and does not impact illicit opioid use. Additionally, a study in 2015
257 noted that REMs merely shifted the pattern of opioid use with decreases in misuse of
258 oxycodone ER to increased initiation of heroin use. [45] This study noted that the odds of
259 initiation of heroin increased by 71%. Opioid policies must target the use of both prescription
260 and illicit use.

261 **Policy Prioritization Proposal**

262 In order to combat this epidemic, policies must be prioritized to focus on overdose
263 death prevention, addiction recovery, reduction of addiction stigma, decriminalization, and
264 preventing new addictions. These policies aim to target both prevention and treatment of
265 current opioid users.

Overdose Deaths

266
267 Another policy priority involves medications that reverse and prevent overdoses.
268 Naloxone is an opioid antagonist that reverses the effects of opioid overdose. [46] Naloxone
269 does not work with other drugs and can only reverse overdose if opioids are in the person's
270 system. Since 1996, there have been community-based programs focusing on overdose
271 prevention programs that include dispensing naloxone. The CDC found that programs in 15
272 states and the District of Columbia reported training and providing naloxone between 1996-
273 2010 resulting in 10,171 drug overdose reversals using naloxone.[47] Naloxone Access Laws
274 (NALs) have been on the rise since 2005. NALs provide immunity from civil and/or criminal
275 prosecution to naloxone prescribers, dispensers, and/or laypersons who administer it to
276 individuals who have overdosed on an opioid. In 2005 there were only 2 states that had NALs
277 and by 2016 there were 46 states with NALs. [48] Additionally, naloxone prescriptions doubled
278 from about 270,000 to 556,000 between 2017 and 2018. [49]

279 Naloxone is not without its critics and complications. Maine's Governor Paul LePage
280 vetoed a 2016 bill that sought to expand naloxone access, writing to the legislature, "Naloxone
281 does not truly save lives; it merely extends them until the next overdose." [50] This seems to be
282 reiterated in a 2017 survey of 405 US adults, in which 51% of respondents believed that having
283 naloxone enabled people to abuse opioids.[51] In Butler County, Ohio Sheriff Richard Jones
284 echoed a similar sentiment, "All we're doing is reviving them, we're not curing them." [50]
285 However, a study of 12,192 naloxone administrations by emergency medical services in
286 Massachusetts between 2013 and 2015 suggested that 94% of recipients survived the day of
287 administration and 84% were alive after 1 year. [52] This study seems to rebuke this idea

288 though this does little to change the overall mindset associated with overdose. Naloxone’s
289 accessibility is also a problem. The CDC’s review of opioid overdose prevention programs
290 reported problems obtaining naloxone related to cost and the supply chain. [47] A JAMA article
291 noted that one-third of patients prescribed naloxone have out-of-pocket costs exceeding \$50
292 which impacts those of lower socioeconomic status.[49] The supply chain access issue is
293 evident through data showing US pharmacies dispensed only 1 naloxone prescription for every
294 69 high-dose opioid prescriptions in 2018. [50] The data on naloxone is promising, however if
295 access is not expanded and education provided to refute baseless claims, the overdose death
296 rates will continue rather than be reversed.

297 Decriminalization

298 Virginia’s Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security recently stated during a
299 federal hearing that, ““We cannot arrest our way out of the heroin and opioid addiction
300 crisis.”[7] The history of the “War on Drugs” has shown us it is ineffective. In 2017, it was
301 estimated that 58 percent of people in state prisons and 63 percent of people serving
302 sentences in jail meet the criteria for diagnosis of drug abuse or dependence. [53] Suzanne
303 Carlberg-Racich, PhD MSPH is an associate professor at DePaul University whose research
304 focuses on HIV/AIDS (Harm Reduction, Cultural Competency, Stigma, Behavior Change) and
305 Harm Reduction (Safer Injection, Overdose Prevention, Service Delivery).[54] During our
306 interview, she stated, “we don’t make people better by punishing them” while also advocating
307 for decriminalization similarly to cannabis. Overzealous law enforcement can lead to fewer
308 people to coming forward when their companions are overdosing, thereby increasing health
309 risks. [37] Another result is the “balloon effect” when the government cracks down on one

310 source of supply for drugs, drug users simply turn to another source. [6] Federal laws are now
311 moving towards reducing the minimum amount of fentanyl that will activate the mandatory
312 sentencing. This could embolden the sale and distribution of even more concentrated fentanyl
313 doses, which would increase the drug's lethality. [37] Regulatory agencies such as the US Drug
314 Enforcement Agency (DEA) would also need to buy in to this policy proposal. The DEA has
315 focused on the criminal justice metrics and seems to lack the scientific expertise to
316 appropriately regulate patient care.[37] The Federal Controlled Substances Act requires the
317 DEA have direct influence over pharmacy practices as related to controlled substances which
318 includes prescription opioids. A recently completed Pew Research Center report found that 63%
319 of people believe that states moving away from mandatory prison sentences for non-violent
320 drug offenders is a good thing. [55] In 2000, Portugal passed a law to decriminalize certain
321 levels of drug possession. If a person is stopped with up to a 10-day supply of drugs are
322 released and instructed to appear at a non-court based setting where they can be referred to
323 treatment or other forms of support. After 9 years, data showed there was no major increase in
324 drug use and injection drug use fell from 3.5 to 2.0 injecting drug users per 1,000 people.[53]
325 Decriminalization would also bring down the criminal justice monetary costs attributed to this
326 epidemic. Continuing with Portugal as an example, after the enactment of this law, arrests on
327 drug-related offenses dropped from 14,000 in 2000 to an average of 5,000-5,500 per year from
328 2001 to 2008. [53] This policy has a history of working in other countries, such as Portugal, and
329 should be implemented in the U.S. to determine its efficacy on a larger scale.

330

331

Stigma Reduction

332
333 Stigma associated with opioid use has large implications for whether prevention policies
334 can be implemented. An example of how much stigma impacts the population’s perspective of
335 opioid use is a survey of 347 US adults published in 2014 that found that 90% did not want
336 people with drug addiction to marry into their family, 78% did not want to work closely with
337 them, and 49% opposed increased government spending on treatment of drug addiction.[56]
338 This attitude towards those with drug addiction limits how impactful interventions can be.
339 Stigma is not limited to public stigma but can also manifest into self-stigma. This self-stigma
340 leads to higher internalized shame and can be a major barrier for individuals to enter treatment
341 for their substance use disorder. [57] Stigma can also be impactful on the type of treatment a
342 person with substance use disorder will receive. One study examined perceptions from
343 healthcare providers and noted that they perceived violence, manipulation, and poor
344 motivation as impeding factors to treatment of patients with substance use disorder. [58] This
345 same study also determined that healthcare providers had a lack of sufficient education,
346 training, and support to help their patients. Coupling these items resulted in negative attitudes
347 from these providers leading to patient’s perceptions of diminished treatment options and lack
348 of empowerment. This demonstrates how important stigma reduction is especially in the
349 healthcare profession. Stigma can be reduced when healthcare providers reported more
350 positive attitudes when they had personal or work experience or contact with substance abuse.
351 [58] This means that the more widely available information and work experience with addiction
352 treatment can lead to treating patients with substance use disorder with empathy. Once
353 patients feel empowered, they are more likely to seek treatment.

Safe Injection Sites

354
355 One major consequence of the opioid epidemic is the high rates of hepatitis C, HIV, and
356 other diseases, mainly due to shared syringes.[35] The sharing of syringes stems from the lack
357 of sterile equipment and fear of social stigma. Those who inject drugs have noted their anxiety
358 of social rejection and fear of the criminal justice system drive their use into “shooting
359 galleries” (structures such as homes—privately owned, abandoned, and otherwise). [59] These
360 structures and non-sterile spaces increase the likelihood of contracting blood-borne diseases
361 such as HIV. In order to avoid sharing syringes, safe injection sites are an advocated
362 intervention. In fact, some 40 cities worldwide have introduced safe injection facilities (SIFs).
363 [59] SIFs are facilities that allow injection drug users (IDUs) to inject drugs while being
364 supervised by licensed health personnel. These personnel do not help IDUs inject the drugs,
365 instead they provide sterile injection supplies, safe disposal, monitor for overdose, provide
366 referrals for substance treatment, and answer questions from IDUs about injections.[59] There
367 is evidence available to prove SIFs are vital in harm reduction. In Sydney, 41% of SIF clients
368 reported adopting at least 1 safer injection technique since using the facility.[59] In Vancouver,
369 SIFs were associated with less-frequent reuse of syringes, less outdoor injecting, using clean
370 water for injection, cooking or filtering drugs prior to injecting, and injecting in a clean
371 location.[59] A visual walkthrough survey conducted to determine whether needle and syringe
372 programs (NSPs) were impactful on the amount of improperly discarded syringes in the two
373 large cities. The results of this survey resulted in proving that eight-fold more improperly
374 disposed syringes were seen on walkthroughs in the city without NSPs compared to the city
375 with NSPs.[60] Due to this risk reduction by SIFs, some have argued that there would be a

376 reduction of public cost due to prevention of diseases such as HIV, death, and crime. However,
377 there is limited data to back-up this theory.

378 The prevention of SIFs ability to open safely without fear of being shut down is
379 threatened by two federal statues under the Controlled Substances Act. The first is section 856,
380 known as the Crack House Statute. This law makes it illegal to “knowingly open or maintain . . .
381 [or] manage or control any place . . . for the purpose of unlawfully . . . using a controlled
382 substance.” [59] This law outright prohibits use of illicit drugs which would outlaw SIFs. The
383 other is Section 844 which prohibits drug possession in its entirety. [59] These laws do not allow
384 SIFs on a federal level, however some states are moving forward through state authorization of
385 SIFs. This becomes a fight similar to the decriminalization of marijuana and the fight between
386 state and federal laws. Another argument against SIFs is that they could become a drug
387 trafficking center and that they help addicts maintain their addictions. [61] William McSwain,
388 the U.S. district attorney of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania illustrated this line of thinking
389 when he said, “they are designed to encourage, perpetuate and normalize behavior that is
390 going to kill you.” [62] These arguments have not been substantiated by evidence, however
391 they provide insight into the stigma associated with IDUs and how hard it is to overcome.
392 Overall, SIFs have data proving their effectiveness but there must be cooperation from both the
393 federal and state governments to ensure they can be established safely.

394 **Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT)**

395 In 2016, the Surgeon General report on alcohol, drugs and health, noted that only one in
396 10 of those with a substance use disorder receive any treatment. [36] Dr. Elizabeth Salisbury-
397 Afshar, the Director of the Center for Addiction Research and Effective Solutions (AIR CARES),

398 described treatment for substance use disorder as tending to follow “abstinence-based
399 philosophy”. Currently physicians can offer three types of medication-assisted therapies (MATs)
400 for treating patients with opioid addiction: methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone.[63]
401 These drugs work because they are opioid agonists that bind to the same receptors in the brain
402 that were activated by the drug of abuse, but in a safer and more controlled manner.[64] These
403 MATs have been proven through a plethora of research studies. For example, a study of heroin-
404 overdose deaths in Baltimore between 1995 and 2009 found an association between the
405 increasing availability of methadone and buprenorphine and an approximately 50% decrease in
406 the number of fatal overdoses. [63] Dr. Salisbury-Afshar, among other addiction physicians,
407 advocates for MATs such as buprenorphine and methadone because they drastically reduce the
408 risk of fatal overdose and reduce both withdrawal symptoms and opioid cravings.[65]
409 Additionally, buprenorphine treatment is also associated with long term benefits such as
410 increased retention in treatment, decreased illicit opioid use, and decreased behaviors
411 associated with the transmission of HIV and Hepatitis C.[65] About 80% of opioid-dependent
412 patients remain in methadone treatment after 6 months.[64] Naltrexone is a newer MAT
413 option however, it carries more risk due to its formulation which differs from methadone and
414 buprenorphine. Naltrexone prevents all effects of any opioid drugs taken while naloxone
415 remains in a person’s system because it blocks opioid receptors.[64] This blocking of effects has
416 led to patients trying to “test” it by using opioids.

417 However, even with these evidence-based interventions, physicians are often hesitant
418 to prescribe MATs due to the stigma associated with what is viewed as swapping one drug for
419 another. The problem with this line of thinking is that it ignores the fact that substance use and

420 addiction are chronic diseases. One such study explained that like other chronic diseases such
421 as diabetes and hypertension, addiction is generally unable to be cured, but effective treatment
422 and functional recovery are possible.[63] There is also lack of access to MAT treatments for
423 those who would benefit. The Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA) increased
424 availability of MAT to patients by allowing their primary care physicians to prescribe these
425 medications. [65] DATA also allowed primary care physicians, addiction physician specialist, or
426 psychiatrists to treat their patients in an outpatient setting. Prior to DATA, MATs could only be
427 provided to patients with a freestanding opioid treatment program (OTP), although methadone
428 is still only accessible through these OTPs.

429 Caleb Banta-Green, an associate professor of health services at the University of
430 Washington best describes the need for long-term treatment, “Heroin use disorder is a serious
431 medical condition with which individuals are likely to struggle for the rest of their life. We need
432 to give them the tools they need to survive and thrive.”[36] The evidence is clear that MATs
433 should be one part of the long-term treatment needed for opioid abuse recovery.

434 **Alternatives to Opioids**

435 Legislation is often the first thought when discussing solutions to this epidemic.
436 However, the medical profession plays a large role in altering the future of this epidemic. Dr.
437 Howard Kim, an associate professor in Northwestern University’s Department of Medicine [66],
438 emphasized that the number one priority should be to make sure those individuals who are
439 opioid naïve stay opioid naïve if possible. Dr. Kim pointed out in our interview that emergency
440 departments are often the first time people are introduced to opioids. His recommendation is
441 to have providers focus on opioid alternatives for pain management wherever possible. In 2013

442 more than half of all white heroin users started by initially using prescription drugs,[36] thus
443 prevention of initial prescription opioid use may have prevented later heroin use.

444 In a study conducted by researchers including Dr.Kim , there was a significant reduction
445 in opioid prescribing rates once providers were presented with their prescribing rates as
446 compared to their peers. [67] There are currently a variety of nonopioid medications for
447 treatment of various chronic-pain syndromes such as gabapentin (Neurontin), pregabalin
448 (Lyrica), milnacipran (Savella), and duloxetine (Cymbalta) for providers to choose from. [68]
449 Illinois created the Opioid Alternative Pilot Program (OAPP), which allows access to medical
450 cannabis for individuals who have or could receive a prescription for opioids as certified by a
451 physician licensed in Illinois. [69] However, alternatives to prescription opioids may not reduce
452 addiction overall. In 2017 gabapentin was involved in more than a third of Kentucky overdose
453 deaths last year.[70] Gabapentin is also described by users as being able to enhance the
454 euphoric effects of heroin. Abuse of opioid alternatives could be the beginning of the next
455 widespread epidemic. This is why it is imperative that chronic pain management providers treat
456 patient with both pharmaceuticals and appropriate therapies.

457 **Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PMDPS) and Pain Clinic Laws**

458 In a 2018 review of public opinion on which level of government was responsible for
459 combating the epidemic, “36% said the federal government was most responsible, followed by
460 state (28%) and local (21%) governments”. [16] Of particular interest is the fact that 82% of the
461 public believe monitoring doctors’ painkiller-prescribing habits would be an effective policy.
462 [16] This is an important opinion to consider in prioritization of policies that have public buy-in.

463 A current policy that is documented as working is the coupling of PMDPs and pain clinic
464 laws. PDMPs can result in better pain clinic laws. These pain clinic laws aim to reduce the
465 amount of inappropriate prescribing. These laws require such things as registration of pain
466 clinics, registration of which physician(s) own these clinics, prescribing restrictions, and
467 requirements on record-keeping of prescriptions. Florida is an excellent example of the
468 importance of these pain clinic laws. Florida is home to 98 of 100 of the highest quantity of
469 opioid prescribing physicians. In 2010, the state implemented several laws with prescribing
470 restrictions and pain clinic laws. After these measures went into effect, the number of drug
471 overdose deaths decreased by 16.7% between 2010-2012. [71] Furthermore, there was a
472 reduction in overall prescription drug overdose rate of 23.2% as shown in Table 4. These laws
473 also resulted in closing 250 pain clinics. Data collected by Dowell et al. indicates that coupling
474 the pain clinic laws and PMDPs has resulted in reduced the prescribing rates by 80.1 morphine
475 milligram equivalents (MMEs). Additionally, the same data set also noted a reduction in the
476 opioid overdose death rate of 1.2 per 100,000. There were no significant reductions noted
477 when pain clinic laws or PMDPs were implemented seperately.

478 Florida is a successful case study of this coupling. This policy should be expanded to the
479 federal level. Especially when taking into account the public's perception that the federal
480 government is most responsible. A national database would allow providers to see when
481 patients are going to multiple states to gain their opioid prescriptions. This means the public
482 would likely be onboard with a federal set of laws aimed at PMDPs and pain clinic laws. The
483 largest problem with regulating physician prescribing behavior is that it has no way to track

484 heroin or other illicit opioid use. This system could simply force those who are using
485 prescription opioids to turn to illicit drug use.

486 **Conclusion**

487 The Trump administration announced \$1.8 billion in federal funding to combat this
488 epidemic. [72] However, this announcement lacks any solid plan for what the funding will go
489 towards. Andrew Kolodny, a physician and a director of opioid policy research at the Heller
490 School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University, was interviewed by the New
491 York Times to comment on this new funding announcement. Dr. Kolodny summed up what this
492 announcement means without a plan, “ It’s like pointing to a burning building, saying there is an
493 emergency, then not calling the fire department.” [72] In order to appropriately distribute this
494 funding, we must focus on evidence-based interventions that target both current use and
495 prevention of future use. The policies outlined above all have pros and cons, however these
496 policies have research evidence and opioid expert buy-in on their effectiveness. The opioid
497 epidemic will continue on unless we, as public health professionals, take the time to examine
498 these policies and push for their use. Otherwise, we should simply become accustomed to this
499 epidemic as our new normal.

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
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SOURCE: National Vital Statistics System Mortality File.

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
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516 Figure 2. [29]

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Exhibit 2. All-cause annual mortality rates, ages 15–64, by region (1999–2015)‡*



‡Rates are presented as deaths per 100,000 population. Rates are age-adjusted.

*For all years, the Appalachian rates are significantly different from the non-Appalachian U.S. rate, $p \leq 0.05$

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
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529 Figure 3. [38]



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
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541 Figure 4.[71]

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FIGURE 1. Overdose death rates* for selected substances, by year — Florida, 2003–2012†



* Per 100,000 population. Based on Florida Department of Health resident population estimates, available at <http://www.floridacharts.com/flquery/population/populationrpt.aspx>.

† The source of overdose death data is the Florida Medical Examiners Commission.

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